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Chapter 61
United Nations 
Stabilization Mission  
in Haiti  (MINUSTAH)
Nicolas Lemay-Hébert
Introduction
The United Nations (UN) Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was estab-
lished in April 2004 to replace the Multinational Interim Force that had been 
deployed to stabilize the country in February. That same month, President Aristide 
was once again forced to flee Haiti amid political turmoil and violence. For some, 
Aristide was a victim of international imperialism.1 The story is probably more com-
plex, rooted in Haiti’s social struggles, and affected by strong international and local 
factors. Overall, both domestic and international constraints led Aristide to break 
with his original populist agenda in his second administration and revert to older 
methods of governance.2 With the conflict between pro-government forces and the 
opposition (under the loose umbrella of the Convergence Démocratique and Group 
of 184)  heating up, Aristide lost the loyalty of some of his supporters and found 
himself increasingly isolated. Calls for his resignation became more insistent. On 
29 February 2004, Aristide resigned and left the country at a time of great volatility 
(he claimed to have been abducted by the United States). Subsequently, the United 
Nations, the United States, Canada, and the European Union were instrumental in 
the formation of a government of technocrats, headed by Gérard Latortue, to lead 
the transition to the elections of 2006.
MINUSTAH was deployed in June 2004 to facilitate this process and re-establish sta-
bility in the country. MINUSTAH’s presence in Haiti has been marked by several inter-
nal and external shocks,3 affecting this stabilization agenda. The worldwide food price 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Thu Apr 02 2015, NEWGEN
06_part_5.indd   722 4/2/2015   9:41:56 AM
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)   723
inflation of 2008 led to riots in most major centers in the country and to the resignation 
of the then Prime Minister Jacques-Édouard Alexis. Political instability had also been 
exacerbated by natural disasters, including a series of tropical storms and hurricanes 
in 2008. However, the earthquake of 10 January 2010 brought an unprecedented degree 
of devastation to Haiti. Estimates vary between 200,000 and 300,000 persons injured, 
65,000 to 316,000 deaths.4 Most of the state apparatus was destroyed and infrastruc-
tural damage extended from Leogane to the cities of Port-au-Prince, Grand-Goâve, 
Petit-Goâve, Jacmel, and Carefour. Adding to these setbacks, MINUSTAH’s tenure has 
been marked by various alleged scandals involving peacekeeping personnel, includ-
ing sexual misconduct and, most especially, the cholera affair that rocked the United 
Nations.
MINUSTAH’s mandate
MINUSTAH was set up by UNSC Resolution 1542, 30 April 2004, to support Haiti’s tran-
sitional government in ensuring a secure and stable environment within which Haitian 
constitutional and political processes could take place. The mandate included support for 
security sector reform (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs and the 
reform of the Haitian National Police), promotion and protection of human rights, and 
assistance in organizing and monitoring elections in the country.
UNSC Resolution 1608, 22 June 2005; UNSC Resolution 1702, 15 August 2006; UNSC 
Resolution 1743, 15 February 2007; UNSC Resolution 1780, 15 October 2007; and UNSC 
Resolution 1840, 14 October 2008, adjusted the mandate of the mission and MINUSTAH’s 
authorized strength to adapt to the changing circumstances on the ground.
Following the 12 January 2010 earthquake, the UN Security Council, through UNSC 
Resolution 1908, 19 January 2010, increased its authorized strength from 6,940 troops and 
2,211 police to 8,940 troops and 3,711 police to support the immediate recovery, reconstruc-
tion, and stability efforts in the country. UNSC Resolution 1927, 4 June 2010, added another 
680 police as a “temporary surge capacity.” UNSC Resolution 2070, 12 October 2012, ini-
tiated MINUSTAH’s withdrawal, cutting the authorized strength to 6,270 troops and 
2,601 police. MINUSTAH is the first UN peacekeeping mission with a majority of Latin 
American troops.5
Duration: From June 2004
Initial authorized strength: up to 6,700 troops; 1,622 civilian police; 548 international civilian 
personnel; 154 UN volunteers; 995 local civilian staff
Actual strength (as of 31 May 2013):  6,179 troops; 2,630 police (including formed police 
units); 435 international civilian personnel; 194 UN volunteers; 1,323 local civilian staff
Main troop and police contributors (more than 100 personnel), as of 30 June 2013:6 Brazil 
(1,407); Uruguay (942); Sri Lanka (874); Jordan (595); Argentina (578); Nepal (507); Chile 
(479); India (458); Peru (373); Bangladesh (321); Bolivia (208); Rwanda (180); Philippines 
(178); Indonesia (173); Paraguay (163); Senegal (151); Pakistan (147); Guatemala (137); Côte 
d’Ivoire (127); Canada (126).
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MINUSTAH: mandate, achievements  
and limitations
MINUSTAH’s mandate differs from preceding UN missions in Haiti in two ways. First, 
it has a greater emphasis on security exemplified by the contributing countries’ last-
ing commitment in terms of troops and police since the set-up of the mission. Second, 
greater importance is given to human rights with Security Council resolutions, placing 
these issues at the heart of the UN’s presence in Haiti.7 At the same time, MINUSTAH 
came to be criticized locally and internationally precisely for its tendency to focus too 
much on security (through the securitization of social issues) and its track record on 
human rights.
MINUSTAH’s presence and mandate can be broken down into three parts. In the first 
phase (from 2004 to 2006), the mission focused exclusively on restoring stability follow-
ing Aristide’s exile and on providing security for the 2006 elections. The second phase 
(from 2006 to 2010) was characterized by a focus on securing difficult neighborhoods of 
Port-au-Prince as well as on security sector reform (SSR). This phase also involved rec-
onciliation and political dialogue in preparation for the 2010 parliamentary and presi-
dential elections. The third phase started with the 2010 earthquake with the security 
agenda back at the top of the priority list, along with support of recovery and reconstruc-
tion programs. The third phase was drawing to a close at the end of 2013 accompanied by 
debates over how to support an effective transition to a post-MINUSTAH Haiti.8
During the first years of MINUSTAH’s deployment, SSR, although pivotal to the 
mission’s initial mandate, was overshadowed by the “stabilization” agenda, with 
MINUSTAH focusing on the restoration of the Haitian state’s effective authority and 
the preparation for the 2006 elections. The fact that Haiti was still undergoing a violent 
transition and was not in a post-conflict situation played a role in delaying the imple-
mentation of SSR activities. In this context, a multinational interim force led by the 
United States, Canada, and France with 3,600 troops had preceded MINUSTAH with a 
mandate to restore a modicum of stability in the highly volatile situation following the 
forced exile of Aristide in February 2004. A year later, the UN had established its pres-
ence throughout the country, although the security situation in Port-au-Prince was still 
tense. The UN securitization policy was then carried out through three specific chan-
nels: the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former members 
of the Haitian military forces; the neutralization of urban gangs and their incorporation 
into DDR programs; and a purging of the Haitian national police. However, none of 
these goals was fully achieved.9 Elections were another key component of MINUSTAH’s 
mandate. On 7 February 2006, René Préval was elected, but amidst familiar allegations 
of fraud.
After 2006, the renewal of MINUSTAH’s mandate included a reinforcement of its 
SSR agenda, and the UN mission therefore supported police, judicial, and penitentiary 
reform, albeit on largely separate tracks.10 The security environment remained unstable, 
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though one of MINUSTAH’s most important contributions was to serve as a deter-
rent to further armed gang violence, political turbulence, major civil unrest, and drug 
trafficking.11
As of 2010, the post-earthquake agenda concentrated on the security of displaced per-
sons, support for national elections and the establishment of a government that could 
accelerate reconstruction. MINUSTAH has also promoted a rule of law compact with 
the Haitian authorities, the private sector, and other international actors to integrate the 
stabilization and economic development agendas. However, this initiative was dogged 
by political bickering between the executive and the parliament.12 Another impediment 
to SSR has been the lack of effective coordination between different donor countries 
(a recurring theme in Haiti). This led MINUSTAH’s then Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General (SRSG), Edmond Mullet, to state that “the Haiti National Police 
[HNP] is an example of the international community’s failure to work in concert.”13 
Since 2004 police reform has followed a relatively narrow and technical agenda that 
emphasized training and vetting—an approach challenged by structural constraints and 
realities on the ground.14 As a consequence, despite many achievements, an overarching 
vision of SSR that would integrate state-building and security sector reform was absent 
within MINUSTAH.15 This set the UN on a course that reinforced the dynamics that had 
caused social tensions in the first place.
Achievements and limitations
MINUSTAH and the Haitian state
MINUSTAH took over from a succession of UN missions—UNMIH (chapter 45), 
UNSMIH (chapter 46), UNTMIH (chapter 49), MIPONUH (chapter 50) and MICAH, 
which had been deployed in Haiti inter alia to help the development of the Police 
Nationale d’Haïti (Haitian National Police—HNP), as well as to reinforce prison and 
judicial reform with the aim of creating conditions to allow the development of stable 
politics in the country. Each of these missions contributed to stabilizing Haiti following 
the Duvalier era (1957–86) as well as to the state-building process. The struggle between 
Haiti’s impoverished majority and the wealthy few was at the center of Haitian politics 
before and after independence, and politics has constantly been orchestrated by “preda-
tory elites.” Diverse international influences have combined with local structures of 
power to create hybrid governance structures and it is thus difficult to neatly separate 
international and local factors in the state-building process.16
Security institutions have traditionally played a crucial role in Haitian politics as 
agents of governance, especially before the Duvalier era. Paramilitary groups were also 
instrumental in the quest for power in Haiti: from the tonton macoutes under François 
Duvalier, to the attachés in the immediate post-Duvalier era or the pro-Aristide 
Chimères (or chimè), and anti-Aristide renegade military officers (under the banners 
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of the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti and the Revolutionary Front 
for the Liberation of Haiti). In this context, externally-led SSR policies were fraught 
with risk, having to walk the fine line between strengthening security institutions in a 
state-building context and attempting to disarm paramilitary groups pursuing their 
own political agendas. As a consequence, the insistence by UNMIH on the inclusion 
of former Forces Armées d’Haïti (Haitian Armed Forces—FADH) personnel in the new 
police force resulted in the force lacking legitimacy among large parts of the popula-
tion.17 These circumstances contributed to the 2004 crisis, with former army officers 
playing a role in the coup against Aristide.18 Similarly, while MINUSTAH contributed 
to the establishment of security following the 2004 crisis and helped organize the elec-
tions in 2006, it also reinforced the logic of confrontation at play in Haitian politics 
(MINUSTAH continued the earlier UNMIH policy of incorporating ex-army paramili-
taries in the police force).19
In a context of social struggle between Haiti’s impoverished majority and the wealthy 
few, a struggle exacerbated by Aristide’s controversial “exile” and a transitional gov-
ernment perceived as siding with the elite, MINUSTAH’s approach to strengthening 
security institutions and its disarming of “rebels” could be seen as partisan and a contin-
uation of past policies. The Latortue government (2004–6) and its domestic and foreign 
supporters (including the United Nations) opted for a military solution to address what 
was fundamentally a social, economic, and cultural problem. While MINUSTAH hesi-
tantly challenged the presence of the disbanded Haitian army in a few localities, it used 
significantly more repressive means to curb the power of the pro-Aristide Chimères 
(“chimeras”) in Cité Soleil.20 In the first twenty-two months following Aristide’s forced 
departure, an estimated 8,000 people were murdered and 35,000 women were sexu-
ally assaulted.21 Identified perpetrators included criminals from pro- and anti-Aristide 
groups, the national police—and UN peacekeepers as well. In “Operation Baghdad,” the 
name given to the ghetto uprising by the interim government in an attempt to label the 
people fighting as terrorists,22 MINUSTAH and the police proceeded to “clean” the “dif-
ficult” urban areas of Cité Soleil (or Cité Soley) and Bel Air in Port-au-Prince. These 
actions by MINUSTAH were in line with the requirements of the UN Security Council, 
and especially Resolution 1743 (2007) which demanded strong measures against the 
“armed gangs.”
However, the joint MINUSTAH-Latortue government approach was to equate all 
Chimères or “armed gangs” with pro-Aristide Chimères,” and then these Chimères with 
bandits.23 UN forays in these areas to fight “bandits” led to 100 wounded in October 
2005 and between 170 and 205 in December 2005.24 Half of these persons were women 
and children which, for the SRSG Edmond Mullet, amounted to mere “collateral dam-
age.”25 As Robert Muggah noted, the end result was that these muscular enforcement-led 
operations “appeared in some cases both to disperse and simultaneously to radicalise 
youth and so-called gangs.”26 There is no denying that insecurity became a major social 
issue in Haiti after the departure of Aristide. This led on from political violence target-
ing the interim government, the police and MINUSTAH into more random acts of vio-
lent crime and undoubtedly MINUSTAH/PNH operations managed to bring stability 
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in these areas. However, to look at the Chimères phenomenon and the post-2004 surge 
of violence solely through a security lens appeared misguided, as security issues were 
intertwined with equally important political and economic grievances. In this context, 
MINUSTAH was accused of responding only to the symptoms of violence rather than 
to its causes.27 In the end, while the operation was relatively successful in restoring a cli-
mate of security, it also contributed (intentionally or not) to the state-building process, 
tilting the balance of power in favor of certain groups in the competition for control of 
the Haitian state.
The UN indicted: the cholera crisis and sexual misconduct
Since its establishment in June 2004, the UN’s presence in Haiti has “at times been prob-
lematic, even divisive,” as one observer put it.28 Many Haitian interviewed felt that it was 
a return to international occupation under a new guise (a complaint to a certain extent 
recognized by international officials following the earthquake of 2010).29 At the same 
time and throughout the evolution of the mission, many prominent international offi-
cials voiced their opposition to the security emphasis of MINUSTAH, feeling that the 
mission should reorient itself towards a more developmental agenda.30
A string of sexual scandals afflicting the military components of MINUSTAH fuelled 
the anti-UN sentiment. In 2007, 111 Sri Lankan soldiers were repatriated after allega-
tions of sexual exploitation and abuse of minors.31 In January 2011, Pakistani troops were 
accused of the rape of a boy in Gonaïves and of having sexual relations with minors 
in the capital; three of them were later found guilty of sexual exploitation and abuse 
and were condemned to a one-year jail sentence.32 In July 2011, Uruguayan troops were 
accused of sexually assaulting a young man in the southern town of Port-Salut (while 
only being charged with “coercion” offences). There was an “amplification factor” at 
work, with each scandal building on the narrative of occupation in Haiti and feeding 
latent hostility towards international troops in certain segments of the society (espe-
cially in highly politicized student circles in Port-au-Prince).33 This “legitimacy issue” 
was further increased by a number of public relations fiascos following the 2010 earth-
quake, such as the hiring of two vessels to accommodate UN staffers (echoing a simi-
lar situation which affected the UN presence in Timor-Leste in 1999).34 MINUSTAH 
became a convenient scapegoat for everything that went wrong in Haiti (and for the 
inaction of the Haitian government), echoing what has been dubbed the “legitimacy 
dilemma” where the actions of international staff in situations of authority are used 
against them.35
Local support for the UN mission, while never high, decreased dramatically after the 
outbreak of cholera in October 2010,36 and allegations of sexual assaults and attempted 
homicide.37 A few months after the 2010 earthquake there was a cholera outbreak which 
began in Mirebalais, in the Artibonite region, killing more than 8,000 people and affect-
ing over 670,000. While the origin of the outbreak was debated38 most Haitians were 
convinced that the pathogen was introduced by peacekeepers from the UN Nepali 
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camp.39 As one Haitian official put it: “MINUSTAH is a houngan (vodou priest), and 
behind the houngan hides the cholera.”40 MINUSTAH and the cholera are also often 
presented as “Marrasa” (twins in Haitian vodou).41 In this atmosphere, within weeks 
after the first cases there was stoning of UN vehicles and clashes, some fatal, between 
locals and UN forces.42 Similarly, following the news of the sexual scandals, protests 
spread around Haiti, as people took to the streets demanding that the United Nations 
leave the country.
This situation put the Brazilian leadership in a difficult position. While Brazil’s 
engagement was partly meant to enhance the country’s profile as it was campaigning 
for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, local resistance on the ground led the 
government to reassess its position on Haiti. As the senior advisor to the Brazilian gov-
ernment, Marcel Biato, noted, “in the eyes of the local population, a liberating army can 
quickly become an occupation force.”43 Brazilian troops certainly played a crucial role 
in the securitization of the difficult neighborhoods of Bel Air and Cité Soleil, but this 
engagement also came at a price, financial and political.44
While the engagement in MINUSTAH cost over R$1 billion to Brazilian taxpayers it 
also became increasingly unpopular within Brazil itself.45 In November 2011, a confer-
ence was convened in São Paulo (Brazil) against the “occupation” of Haiti, with the par-
ticipation from over 600 members of trade unions, social movements, political parties, 
and other organizations. A letter to the Brazilian president was also signed by a number 
of legislators in 2011, stating that “we must end Brazil’s participation in a military opera-
tion that is repudiated by the vast majority of the Haitian people [ … ] this occupation 
has only deepened the plight of the people and has denied them their sovereignty.”46 
Brazil’s defense minister, Celso Amorim, seemed to acknowledge the discontent when 
he declared in 2011 that he “supports the withdrawal of Brazilian troops from Haiti.”47 
Yet how an exit strategy will materialize remains to be seen.
Alternatives to the securitization approach in Haiti
In MINUSTAH’s initial approach securitization was predominant but it was not the 
only strategy.48 An example of an alternative approach was the “integrated security 
and development program” in the Bel Air district undertaken by Viva Rio, a Brazilian 
NGO.49 The program aimed at engaging communities in an informal way and bring-
ing “gangs” into a dynamic process of dialogue between themselves, and with the police 
and MINUSTAH. Another example was the community violence reduction (CVR) pro-
gram, a separate section of MINUSTAH established in 2007 as an attempt to do things 
differently in Haiti. The program aimed to create economic and social opportunities 
with a view to diverting gang members from violence.50 As the CVR team leader put it, 
“we realised that the DDR strategy was ill-adapted to the context, that local dynamics 
were more complex. [ … ] If the other sections will deal with the state, this section will 
focus on the community-level.”51
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Another CVR official was even more critical: “each time the military officers ‘screw 
up’, we have to pick up the pieces. [ … ] We constantly have to stabilise a situation previ-
ously destabilised by military units.”52 It might be too soon to see it as a “model for future 
interventions”53—and one also needs to be careful with “one size fits all” mindsets—but 
these initiatives represent an interesting evolution in the security landscape in Haiti.
Conclusion: the unintended 
consequences of intervention
Haiti’s lack of proper sewage and sanitation systems, exacerbated by the 2010 earth-
quake have been labeled a “perfect storm” for the outbreak of the massive epidemic of 
cholera.54 This has been used by the UN to absolve itself from responsibility for the out-
break of cholera while facing a pending multimillion-dollar lawsuit. In the meantime, 
one could also use the cholera outbreak as a “perfect storm” analogy to understand the 
nature of local resistance to MINUSTAH, unveiling the limits of its securitization policy 
and of the international role in “strengthening” what has always been a highly politi-
cized Haitian security sector. Similarly, debates surrounding the cholera outbreak shed 
new light on the “unintended consequences” of peacekeeping. Beyond the evaluation 
of outside interventions through “lessons learned” papers, the detrimental aspects of 
international presences, including the impact on local economies and structures of gov-
ernance, also require attention. Haiti’s cholera crisis put this agenda at the forefront of 
debates.
In this context, a proper recognition of the social and political aspects of peace 
consolidation in Haiti must prevail over technocratic approaches. MINUSTAH has 
undoubtedly contributed to the “stabilization” of Haiti,55 even if at times in a politically 
partisan way. Had it not been for the UN’s presence, the transitional government would 
probably have been engulfed in the 2004–6 surge of violence.56 However, international 
and local actors must move beyond “stabilization” discourses and address structural 
violence.57 This requires a comprehensive overview of the intended and unintended 
impacts of international policies. What the UN may have failed to recognize in its suc-
cessive Haitian missions, and perhaps most tellingly with MINUSTAH, is that interna-
tional influences have historically been integral to Haiti’s political processes.
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